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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant was employed as a truck driver for May 
Trucking Company (May) in Layton, Utah, from 20 September, 
1984 to 19 December, 1985. (R. at 37). Appellant's job 
function was to perform cross-country driving for May, On or 
about 20 December, 1985> after Appellant returned from an 
assignment, May discovered that on that trip the road speed 
governor on Appellant's truck had been tampered with. (R. at 
39). The governor is normally set at approximately sixty-two 
miles per hour (62 mph). (R. at 39). The Rockwell trip 
master computer on board the truck showed that the Appellant 
had averaged 4 or 5 miles per hour over the governor's limit 
on the last trip, (R. at 41). May had an incentive bonus 
program which provided that if a driver drove under 60, that 
driver got a three cent per mile additional bonus, and 
Appellant had received that bonus quite often. (R. at 42). 
The daily trip reports also showed that from 21 November, 
1985 to 22 November, 1985, Appellant had driven approximately 
21 1/2 hours out of 24 hours. (R. at 44). 
Both the tampering with the road governor and the 
excessive driving time were violations of May's company 
policy by Appellant. Although these violations could result 
in termination, Appellant was merely suspended from work 
because of his exemplary driving record. (R. at 9, 24, 48, 
69). As a condition to returning to work Appellant was 
required to submit to a urinalysis test. (R. at 69). May 
felt that petitioner could not have driven for the sustained 
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period without some type of chemical assistance. (R. at 46). 
The urinalysis showed a trace of marijuana in Appellant's 
system. (R. at 9* 46). Appellant was terminated at that 
point by May. 
Appellant filed for unemployment benefits and was 
denied on 24 January, 1986. Appellant requested and had a 
hearing before the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on 19 
February, 1986. (R. at 9). In a written opinion, the ALJ 
found that Appellant was not discharged for disqualifying 
reasons and allowed unemployment benefits. (R. at 11). The 
ALJ's decision was based partly on the fact that Appellant's 
violations of the speed and hour policies would not alone 
have resulted in termination. (R. at 10). Although the ALJ 
found the employer was justified in its drug policy, the ALJ 
found insufficient evidence to support May's claim that 
Appellant understood that any use of drugs would result in 
termination (R. at 10). Appellant testified that he 
understood he could only be terminated if drug use influenced 
his driving performance or if he used drugs in or around a 
company vehicle. (R. at 10, 17). Petitioner also testified 
that he had not consumed drugs for quite some time. (R. at 
25)y that he had not used drugs while driving (R. at 16, 26), 
and that he was not a regular drug user. (R. at 17, 26). 
Consequently, the ALJ allowed benefits. 
On appeal by May to the Board of Review of the 
Industrial Commission (Board) the ALJ's decision was 
reversed. (R. at 6). The Board acknowledged insufficient 
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evidence as to a discharge based on drug usage. (R. at 6). 
The Board, however, felt that the speed and hour violations 
occurring during Appellant's last trip for May were serious 
enough, coupled with the drug usage, to warrant the discharge 
of petitioner. (R. at 7). The decision of the Board was 
split with commissioners Hadley and Hannan reversing the ALJ, 
and 
commissioner Belka dissenting. Commissioner Belka agreed 
that the drug usage evidence was insufficient. He felt, 
however, that the violations of speed were not serious since 
Appellant had averaged 66 mph, but the employer had 
authorized speeds of 62 mph which also violated the law. (R. 
at 8) . 
After the Board's decision, Appellant filed a 
notice of appeal. The matter is now before this Court. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The standard of review for decisions of the Board 
of Review is twofold. The Board's findings of fact will not 
be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence. In this 
appeal the record shows that the ALJ's findings, not the 
Board's findings, are supported by substantial evidence and 
should be followed by this Court. Those findings (the ALJ's) 
indicate that Appellant was discharged for non-disqualifying 
reasons and, thus, that Appellant is entitled to unemployment 
benefits. 
The conclusions of law made by the Board must be 
reasonable and rational. In this appeal, again, it is the 
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ALJfs conclusions that are reasonable and rational, not the 
Board's conclusions. The evidence shows that Appellant was 
not discharged for just cause. As to marijuana usage, both 
the ALJ and the Board agree that Appellant was without the 
knowledge requirement. As to the tampering and excessive 
driving time, the evidence supports the conclusion that 
Appellant was without sufficient culpability. Thus, the 
conclusion that Appellant was discharged for just cause is 
erroneous and the ALJ!s conclusion that Appellant was 
discharged for non-disqualifying reasons should be 
reinstated. 
ARGUMENT 
THERE ARE TWO STANDARDS OP REVIEW IN CASES OP THIS 
TYPE WHICH ARE BASED ON THE RATIONALITY OP THE 
BOARD OP REVIEW'S DECISION. 
A. THE STANDARD OP REVIEW FOR FACTUAL FINDINGS 
OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW IS BASED ON STATUTE. 
This Court is bound by the findings of fact of the 
Commission and Board of Review if supported by evidence, 
pursuant to §35-4-10(1) Utah Code Annotated (1953, as 
amended). Trotta v. Department of Employment Security, 664 
P.2d 1195 (Utah 1983). The Board of Review (Board) did not 
make written findings of fact; however, in its written 
decision there is no indication that it was not following 
the findings of fact adopted by the Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ). Consequently, this Court could conclude that the 
Board incorporated the ALJfs findings of fact into its 
decision. The Board simply disagreed with the ALJfs 
conclusions. 
A 
The Board did, however, dispute one finding of the 
ALJ. The ALJ found that Appellant was discharged because 
traces of marijuana were found in his system. The Board 
found that Appellant was discharged on the basis of four 
cumulative events: 
1. Alteration of the 62 MPH road speed governor; 
and 
2. Evidence that the on-board computer showed 
the truck had averaged 66 MPH; and 
3. Evidence that the truck had been operated 
for 22 hours during a 24 hour period; and 
4. Applicant was tested and found to have traces 
of marijuana in his system. 
The difference is that the Board found Appellant was 
discharged for reasons one through four, while the ALJ found 
that Appellant was discharged only for reason four. The ALJ 
found that for reasons one through three, Appellant was 
merely suspended. 
This distinction is critical. If the finding of 
the ALJ is followed, then Appellant was not discharged for 
disqualifying reasons and is entitled to unemployment 
benefits. Not only was this the decision of the ALJ, but it 
also appears that the Board agreed with that consequence. 
The Board, in its decision, acknowledged that there was very 
likely insufficient evidence to show when Appellant had used 
marijuana and what effects it had on Appellant if any. The 
only reason the Board reversed the ALJ, as stated previously, 
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was due to the cumulative facts rather than the marijuana 
fact alone. A close examination of the proceedings before 
the ALJ, and certain other documents in the record, shows the 
Board's finding is not based on substantial evidence. Trotta 
v. Department of Employment Security, 664 P.2d 1195, 1198 
(Utah 1983) (and cases there cited). 
A letter dated 16 January, 1986 from Mr. Greg 
Weigel, Personnel Manager of May Trucking, was received by 
Appellant. The letter first states that Appellant was 
discharged for violating the safety regulations on logging 
and driving time. But apparently this is not why Appellant 
was actually terminated, because the letter goes on to say 
that Appellant was only suspended due to his previous good 
driving record. The letter makes it clear that Appellant was 
terminated only after the urinalysis tested positive for 
marijuana. Thus, the letter is evidence that goes against 
the Board's decision. 
In the hearing before the ALJ, a representative 
of the employer was asked what brought on the termination. 
The representative responded that it was a combination of 
things and then said, "Had it not been for the positive 
results on the drug test, Mr. Grinnell probably would have 
had a two-week suspension and then it would have been over 
with." After determining that the marijuana problem alone 
was a ground for termination, the representative also stated 
that tampering and excessive hours were also grounds for 
termination. But the point was reiterated that the violation 
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that brought on the termination was the marijuana test. The 
testimony heard by the ALJ showed that Appellant was 
terminated for marijuana usage. Based on this and other 
testimony, the ALJ found no knowledge on Appellant's part 
and, thus, that he was not discharged for disqualifying 
reasons. This Court has held that because of the technical 
experience of the ALJ, and the ALJ's ability to more closely 
evaluate the testimony proffered, great deference should be 
afforded to the ALJ's decision. Kehl v. Board of Review, 700 
P.2d 1129, 1133 (Utah 1985). The testimony at the hearing, 
then also goes against the Board's decision and supports the 
ALJ's decision. 
In conclusion, the ALJ's decision is supported by 
substantial evidence. The letter and the testimony both 
support the ALJ's finding that Appellant was not discharged 
for the tampering or traveling violations, but only for the 
urinalysis results. The Board's decision that Appellant was 
discharged for the tampering or traveling violations is not 
supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, this Court 
should follow the findings of the ALJ and not the Board, in 
making its decision. 
B. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW OF THE LEGAL STANDARDS 
APPLIED BY THE BOARD OF REVIEW ARE BROADER 
THAN THE REVIEW OF FACTUAL FINDINGS. 
This Court has stated that it will not defer to the 
legal standard applied by the Board of Review except under 
legislative intent expressed in statutory language. Trotta 
v. Department of Employment Security, 664 P.2d 1195, 1198 
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(Utah 1983) • The court there stated that the review of the 
legal standards applied by the Board of Review is 
considerably broader than its review of the factual findings 
of the Board, L3. Yet, this Court has also stated that the 
Board's decision shall be affirmed unless as a matter of law 
only the opposite conclusion could be drawri from the facts. 
Board of Education of Sevier County School District v. Board 
of Review, 701 P.2d 1064 (Utah 1985) • It appears, then, that 
the rule of review currently adopted by the court is that 
stated in Wright's Furniture Mill, Inc. v. Industrial 
Commission, 707 P.2d 113 (1985). There the court deferred to 
the ALJfs application of law to fact so long as the decision 
is "reasonable and rational." In the instant case, based on 
his technical expertise or more extensive Experience in the 
administrative agency, the ALJ concluded that Appellant had 
not been discharged for disqualifying reasons. This 
conclusion is well documented in the ALJ!s decision. The 
evidence was clear that Appellant did not meet the knowledge 
standard required for a finding of discharge for just cause. 
The legal conclusion is clear that absent knowledge, 
culpability and control, the claimant is not disqualified 
from receiving unemployment benefits. Uta)h Department of 
Employment Security Rule A71-07-1:5(H)-1 • 
1. The ALJ?S Decison That Appellant Was 
Without The Requisite Knowledge Was 
Reasonable and Rational. 
The ALJ, after finding that Appellant was 
discharged because of the urinalysis test results, turned to 
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the question of whether Appellant was discharged for just 
cause, A determination of just cause is based on the three 
factors of knowledge, culpability and control. Rule 
A71-07-1:5(H)-1. All three factors must be present to 
establish just cause. The ALJ found that in this case the 
factor of knowledge was missing and therefore Appellant was 
not discharged for just cause. 
The employer testified that it was company policy 
to discharge for any use of drugs whether on or off the road, 
and that Appellant knew this. Appellant, however, testified 
that he did not know any use was grounds for discharge, 
although he knew that use while driving or while around the 
truck was grounds for discharge. He also testified that he 
had not used marijuana for quite some time, and that even 
then he did not use it regularly. The ALJ found that there 
was insufficient evidence to support the employer's position 
and thus found that Appellant had not been shown to have the 
required knowledge for a just cause discharge. This legal 
conclusion is fully substantiated by the evidence and should 
not be disturbed by this Court. 
2. The Board's Decision That Appellant Was 
Disqualified From Receiving Unemployment 
Benefits is Not Reasonable Nor Rational. 
The Board agreed that the evidence on marijuana 
usage was insufficient to establish knowledge and so just 
cause, but found disqualifying behavior in the tampering and 
traveling time. As has been discussed, this finding of the 
Board is not supported by substantial evidence, and is also 
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reversible as a misapplication of the law. 
The Board concluded that because Appellant could 
have been terminated for the tampering and traveling time 
violations he was terminated for just cause. This conclusion 
is in error. First, the two violations do not result in 
mandatory discharge as evidenced by the employer's testimony 
that Appellant was only suspended for those violations. The 
Board cannot decide for the employer that discharge was 
warranted when the employer has already made the decision not 
to discharge Appellant. Second, although not couched in this 
specific language, Appellant's conduct fails to meet the 
culpability requirement of a discharge for just cause. 
The issue of culpability starts with a 
consideration of the seriousness of the conduct as it affects 
continuance of the employment relationship. The Department 
of Employment Security's rules state in part: 
(1) Longevity and prior work record are 
important in determining if the act or 
omission is an isolated incident or a 
good faith error in judgment. An employee 
who has historically complied with work 
rules does not demonstrate by a single 
violation, even though harmful, that such 
violations will be repeated and therefore 
require discharge to avoid future harm to 
the employer... 
Rule A71-07-l:5(H)-l.B.l.a.(l). 
This is precisely the situation involved in the instant case. 
By the employer's own admission, Appellant had an exemplary 
work record. Thus, Appellant was put on suspension and not 
discharged. The Board found that the tampering and traveling 
time violations were violations occurring on the last trip 
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Appellant made for the employer, I.e. a single violation. 
Thus, the element of fault is lacking. Even though 
Appellant's conduct might be grounds for discharge, without 
fault it is not sufficient for disqualification of 
unemployment benefits. Logan Regional Hospital v. Board of 
Review, P.2d , 39 Utah Adv. Rep. 34, 36 (August 5, 
1986). 
It should also be noted what the Department of 
Transportation's remedy is for traveling time violations. 49 
C.F.R. §395.13(a) declares that the Federal Highway 
Administration's special agent can declare a driver out of 
service. The agent must also contact the motor carrier and 
advise it of that fact. The motor carrier cannot allow an 
out of service driver to operate a motor vehicle until the 
driver complies with the rules. §395-3 provides the maximum 
driving and on-duty time allowable. To be back in-service 
th<% driver only needs to take one week off if such driver has 
been on duty more than 60 hours in the last seven (7) 
consecutive days. Or if the driver has driven more than ten 
(10) hours or been on duty more than fifteen (15) hours, such 
driver must take eight (8) consecutive hours off duty. Once 
that is accomplished the driver can be released from being 
out of service. §395 .13(c)(1)(1) . The policy is not to keep 
worn-out drivers off the road, but to assure that drivers on 
the road are fully rested. Since Appellant was suspended for 
at least one week, he would have had plenty of time to rest 
up to get back on the road. This is another reason why the 
Board's decision is not reasonable or rational. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the ALJ's findings are supported by 
substantial evidence, and because the ALJ's decision is 
according to the law, the Board of Review1s decision should 
be reversed since it is not supported by the evidence nor is 
it reasonable or rational. The ALJ's decision should be 
reinstated. 
DATED this^lTJlday of August, 1986. 
Respectfully Submitted 
i o 
ADDENDUM 
Section 35-4-10 Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended) A-2 
Utah Department of Employment Security Rule A71-07-
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Letter from May Trucking to Appellant date January 16, 
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UTAH CODE 
(986-1987 Labor'* Industrial Commission 1 
lion The moneys shall'be invested in the following 
readily * marketable ^classes of' securities;'bonds or 
other» interest-bearing/*obligations iof ' t h e United 
States of 'America.^of, this state,'or of any county, 
city, town;'or'school district of this state, at Current 
market prices for the bonds! The investment shall at 
ill times be so madfe that all the assets of the fund 
shall always be^  readily convertible into cash when 
needed for the payment of benefits, 'hi; > >i ' tnh i9M 
35-4-10. Review of decision or determination7 «'^ >""! 
"Appeal referees J Hoard of review - Witness' ^^>f*t 
if fees ,J Judicial review by Court of Appeals *• '»'J *\* 
'Exclusive procedure.,1'!' .f»<M', >| , i w<,vM),t'<l 
v(a) A review of a decision' o)rl determination Invo-
lving contribution liability of applications foi refund 
shall be made by the commission or its authorized 
representative In accordance with the provisions of 
this act! The decision 'of the representative conduct 
ling the'review is deemed the decision1 of the com-' 
mission. The commission1 or' Itf' authorized tepreseJ 
illative' conducting the review may refer the" matter 
to an appeal referee;'may decide the application for 
review on the basis of any facts and information as 
may be obtained' or *may,' In its discretion,'hear' 
argument or hold a hearing to secure further facts.* 
After the review,* notice of'the decision shall be' 
given to the employing dnltr'The decision made 
pursuant to the'review is the final decision'6f the 
commission unless, within ten days after the date of 
notification or'mailing of the decision, a,( further 
appeal< is initiated under1 the provisions 'of • this* 
section. -(M )*•<'•»! IAI » Jut* I J.IJ 'M i.: !o< , h 
'(b) Within teri'dayiafterthe'fnailing or 'personal 
delivery of a notice of a determination Or decision 
rendered following a review under Subsection (a), an 
employing unit may'appeal to an appeal referee by 
filing a notice of appeal.' The appeal referee shall 
give notice of the pendency of the appeal to the 
commission*, which h then a' party td the'proceed-
ings/'After affording'the parties reasonable oppor-
tunity* for a fair hearing, he shall make findings and 
conclusions and ion that basis affirm/ modify, 'or 
reverse the determination.,,Thc parties shall be pro-* 
mptly notified of the referee's decision and furni-' 
shed'a copy of the decision and findings.' The decP 
sion is the final decision of the commission' unless* 
within ten days after* the date of mailing of notice to' 
the1 parties''last known addresses or In the absence 
of a mailing within ten'days'after the delivery of 
notice/ further appeal is initiated 'under the provis-
ions of this section.Imii !»«*>•« »-*>» *»* »d» "jj . < «" 
(c) The commissi6rt'?shalI;appoint one*or 'more 
Impartial appeal referees consisting In each*case of a 
salaried referee selected in accordance with Subsec-' 
Hon^35-4-11(d) to'hear and decide'referrals or 
appeals relating to claims'for benefits or to decisions 
affecting employing units 'referred to. No1 referee 
may'participate in'any case in which he is an inter-
ested party. Each decision of a referee'shall repre-' 
sent his independent Judgment.l,tl , K l \H{ Hfa' ' ut 
K
 (d)(1) The governor shall appoint a review board 
composed of three impartial members to hear and 
decide Referrals * and appeals from the decision of 
appeal referees.''The members shall be: one indust* 
Hal commissioner • bne'membe'r' who is1 reprcsenta-' 
tive of employers,'and one member Who Is represe^ * 
ntatlye of employees/ hi addition, the governor shall 
appoint* twd*alternates who'are representative of the' 
employers and two alternates who are representative 
of employees/1 The alternates J,shall serve in ' the 
absence of'the'regular member 'or'members."The 
commissioner shall be the chairman'/and all records 
on appeals shall be maintained In the' offices of the 
commission,«those'1 records vtoMncludet|an, app'eal 
docket showing the receipt and I disposition! of the 
appeals* on review. Jlnrlthe* I absence of a i regular 
member the'ehairman shall'designate an alternate.: 
Every case<shall be decided by'a'full three-member 
board.f The members and lth* alternates' shall be 
appointed < for < two-year jterrns'.commencing July I 
and ending June 30; the first appointment effective 
|| July I, 1949. The members!of the1 board other than 
the commissioner shall be'^ftid a pe> diem for each 
day of attendance necesfcary/'and expenses incurred, 
in the performance of their dutles,*i as provided by 
law/ At the board's request'the legal counsel of the 
commission'shall act I asit an -Impartial' aid to the, 
board In outlining the fact* and the Issues, n >»v,i\n , i 
)V (2) The board of Review i within the time'speci-i 
fled for'the filing of appeals'may allow an appeal 
from a decision of an appeals referee on application 
filed within the designated time by any party entitled 
to notice of the'decision: An appeal filed by the 
party shall be allowed as of right if the decision did 
not affirm a prior declslon/lUpon appeal the board 
of review may on the basis of the evidence previo-' 
usly submitted in the case, or upon the basis of any 
additional evidence It requires, affirm,' modify,' or 
reverse the findings,'conclusions, and decision of the 
appeal referee., The board of review shall promptly 
notify'the parties to any proceedings before It of its 
decision, including its findings and conclusions, and 
the decision' is final unless within ten days after' 
mailing of notice to the parties' last known addre-
sses or In the absence of mailing within ten days 
after the delivery of the notification further*appeal 
is • Initiated.sunder'the'provisions of this'section. 
However, upon denial by the board of review of an 
application ' for(J>appeal /from the decision'of, an 
appeal referee the decision of the appeal referee is 
deemed to > be tf' decision of the board of >review 
within the' meaning of this paragraph for purposes 
of judicial review and is subject to judicial review 
within the time and In the? manner provided. •'•<*J > f' 
*» (e) The manner'in which disputed matters'are 
presented,"the reports jrequired from'the claimant 
and employing'units'and the conduct of hearings 
[I and appeals shall'be'in accordance with regulations 
prescribed by Ihe commission for determining the 
rights of* the parties, whether or not the regulations 
conform i toW*ommon-law;'or < statutory' rules of 
evidence'iandj bther technical»rules'of procedure. 
When'theuame lor substantially similar evidence is 
relevant1 and material to the matters in Issue In more, 
than one proceeding, the same time and place for 
considering! each matter1 may »be fixed, hearings 
jointly conddcted, a single record of the proceedings 
made, and evidence introduced with respect to one* 
proceeding considered as introduced In the others, If 
in the judgment of the appeal referee having juris-
diction'of the1 proceedings, the consolidation would 
not be prejudicial to any party. A full and complete 
record shall be kept of all proceedings in connection 
with a disputed matter.' All testimony at any hearing 
upon a disputed matter'shall be reported but need 
not be' transcribed unless the disputed matter is 
appealed.<>*»# Hr» ^4 lUteUm* tUtiiwal ttV* .</ > *> 
* (0 Except'for reconsideration of any'determina-
tion undcrUhe provisions of Subsection 35-4 6(b), 
any right;"fact,> or mattenin Issue, directly passed 
upon J or > necessarily involved in a determination or 
redetermination'which has.become final,i or in a 
decision on \ appeal» under • this t section »which has 
becomei final,' is conclusive for'all the purposes of 
Code • Co 
PtOYQ, U»«)l tot ANNOTATIONS, consult lh* UTAH ADVANCE RFPORTS '-> 1 337 
A-2 
35-4-11. Labor.- Industrial Commission U T A H CODE 1986-198? 
this act as between the commission, the claimant, 
and all employing units that had notice oftthe det-
ermination, redetermination, or decision/Subject to 
appeal proceedings and judicial review as provided 
in this section, any determination, redetermination, 
or decision as to rights to benefits' is conclusive for" 
all the purposes of this act and!ls not:subject to 
collateral attack, by any .employing unit,* irf,csp£cti,ve 
of notice. ' : ;Vi;"i'h ;;.i'i V | ' f»f ^ v»-1- $ |'>nV,V"-4 
(g) Witnesses subpoenaed under ..this section arc 
allowed fees as provided by law for. witnesses in the 
district court of the state. :the fees are part of the, 
expense of administering this act/ •••!•!»»•••'vVhi ij 'm!» Hi 
(h) Any decision in the absence of an- appeal as 
provided becomes final ten days after the date of 
notification or mailing and judicial review, may be 
permitted only after any party claiming td.be aggr-
ieved has exhausted his remedies before the comnP 
ission and board of review as provided by'(his act.l 
The commission is a party to any judicial action 
involving any decisions and shall be represented in* 
the judicial action by any qualified attorney,crnpl-, 
oyed by the commission and designated <byiiti for: 
that purpose or,at the commission's request by.the 
attorney general, M;.;.' *;••'", >x- 'T '* ,MJ 'ry')'i \M :)U'f, 
(i) Within ten days after the decision of the board 
of review has become final, any aggrieved party may: 
secure judicial review by commencing an,'action In; 
the Court of Appeals against the board; of ireview. 
for the review of its decision, in which action any 
other party to the proceeding before the board of. 
review shall be made a defendant -In that action.a, 
petition, which shall state the grounds upon which a1 
review is sought, shall be served, upon a member of 
the board of review or upon that person.'.the, board 
of review designates. This . service
 ; is ^considered 
completed service on all parties, but,there
 ;shall- be 
left with the party served as many copies, of\ the 
petition as there are defendants and the board of, 
review shall mail one copy to each defendant. (With 
its answer, the board of review shall certify!and ,fHe, 
with the court all documents and papers and a, tra-
nscript of all testimony taken in the matter together 
with its findings of fact and decision..The board.of 
review may also, in its discretion* certify to the 
court questions of law involved in: any decision by: 
it. In any judicial proceeding under this section* the-
findings of the commission and the board of review: 
as to the facts if supported by evidence, areconcl-; 
usive and the jurisdiction of the court is confined to 
questions of law. It is(not necessary in any judicial 
proceeding under this section to enter-exceptions to 
the rulings of the commission or the board ofireviewj 
and no bond is required for entering the appeal.. 
Upon final determination of the judicial proceeding, 
the commission shall enter an: order,in, accordance 
with the determination. In: no event, may a petition, 
for judicial review act as a supersedeas^ ,<"••!.'{' ••jh '.y 
(j) The procedure provided for hearings and decf. 
isions with respect to any decision of .determination 
of the commission affecting claimants or employing 
units under this act is the sole and, exclusive proce-
dure, notwithstanding any,;* others provision
 ( of t this 
set. "••!.-; ".'• !.V-'-i 'l,j»'-:>^l,i-;i '[ .rfhs^'-n' «<J .i*M( 
35-4-11, Administration of employment Security m\\r 
Act. :>• '•"•' •';.; - >•:-!'! Mrr f^- tV"''-»o:\i :i'\l\'", '. 
(a)(1) It is the duty of the industrial commission 
to administer this act;- and.it iii entitled to adopt, 
amend, or rescind any general >rules, regulationsn 
and special orders,-to employ persons,! make-expc-, , 
nditurcs,'require reports, make investigations, make 
audits of any or all funds provide^ If or under this' 
act at times'it deems.necessary, And take any'other 
action it ideems: necessary,, or' suitable to: that [end, 
The commission ishall tcreale* the department ..of 
employment security.for the purpose of administe-
ring 'this act, ; All personnel1 of that department, 
including a full-timei administrator jvshftM: be empl-
oyed on-a nonpartisan merit basis. .The full-time 
administrator shall, with: the approval of the com-
mission, determine the department's organization 
and methods,of procedurcln accordanceewith the 
provisions of this act, and heshall, under direction 
of the commission, supervise.-the department pers-
onnel and its operations. .The department of empl-
oyment, security shall have an official seal which 
shall, be judicially noticed. Not later than the first 
day.of October of each,year, the commission shall 
submit, to, the governor a.report covering the admU 
nistration and operation.of this act during the pre-
ceding calendar year and shall make any recomme-
ndations for,.amendments to this.act,as the commi-
ssion deems .• proper* The - report shall • include * 
balance sheet of the moneys in then fund; in which 
Ij there shall be. provided. If possible, a reserve against 
liability in future years to pay benefits In excess 6f 
the.then current contributions,-.which1 reserve shall, 
be set up by the commission, in accordance with 
! accepted actuarial principles on the basis of statistics 
i of employment, business activity, and other relevant, 
factors, for the, longest possible period.(..Whenever, 
the commission believes that a change in ,contribu:, 
: tion or benefit rates will become necessary to protect 
the solvency of the fund, it shall promptly inform, 
the governor ahd the legislature. andt make^approp; 
riate.recommendations. r.,r . \'..': . ,r.>f.:. }'.", ,.'vrV?.f. 
• -.-J •///, (2) Any. two., commissioners .constitute; I 
quorum* No vacancy Impairs the right of the rem* 
aining commissioners to, exercise.all the-powers Of 
the(commission.-r!, v. i.'•/ • ••• ,,>/• .','•• >.,'.•. '..,,, .,v;y 
j,.,r Regulations - General Rule -.Special Orders; ;r w 
. . . ( b ) General ,rules and special .orders may be 
adopted, amended, or rescinded,by the commission 
only after an appropriately noticed public hearing or 
opportunity.to bt heard thereon. Regulation* of the 
commission may be adopted, amended, or rescinded 
and become effective as prescribed by the commis-
sion. General, rules become effective ten days aflef 
filing with the lieutenant governor and publication 
in one or more newspapers of general circulation in, 
this state as the commission shall prescribe. Special, 
orders become effective .ten days after.notification 
or mailing to the last known address of. the, indiy)^ 
duals or concerns affected thereby..;,:
 r,p. ';••• •' r i t 
-: i Printing and Distribution ,of, Act and: Rules,of' 
Commission. '..'., ,».r .'. f »-•• i*\.- ;>:^\\] '• •'i,'%'| 
(c) The commission shall cause to be printed for, 
distribution to the.public theitcxt of. this act, the^  
commission's general, rules, its regulations and itr 
annual,reports to the governor, and any other mat-/, 
erial. the commission deems.- relevant and suitable, j 
and shall furnish; the. same < \o nnyv person < uponL 
application.... \ \,^.,^,'- i'^(pj,V\:^^^V'j»A^ii^^%' 
• j v , | K Personnel Merit System. ; n .' x .{» 'i.\ :(:CJ-.» ufo},, 
•'-«,. (d) The commission shall appoint on a nonpa»j 
rtisan, merit basis*, fix the compensation,; and presc^ 
ribe. the duties and powers of officers,.accountanti,,i 
attorneys, experts, and other personnel as necessary'3 
in the performance, of its. duties... The^commissiortJ 
shall, provide for a merit system covering all those,] 
persons, classify and fix the minimum standards for,; 
the. personnel and formulate salary schedules, for the, 
service so classified.. The, commission shall hold brj 
provide for, holding examinations ,to.determine the;! 
338 For ANNOTATIONS, pleas*,consult thf UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS Code t CO Provo. tl l it 
1-07-1:5 DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY — RULES AND REGULATIONS 
I)-l 35-4-5(b) DISCHARGE 
Section 35-4-5: "An ind iv idual shall be i n e l i g i b l e fo r 
benef i ts or for purposes of establ ishing a wai t ing per iod: 
(b)(1) For the week in which he has been discharged fo r 
j us t cause or for an act or omission in connection wi th 
employment, not cons t i tu t ing a crime, which is de l ibera te , 
w i l l f u l , or wanton and adverse to the employer's r i g h t f u l 
i n te res t , i f so found by the commission, and thereaf ter 
un t i l the claimant has earned an amount equal to at least 
six times the c la imant 's weekly benef i t amount in bona 
f ide covered employment." 
L GENERAL DEFINITION 
) rd i na r i l y accepted concepts of j u s t i c e are used in determining i f a discharge 
is d isqua l i fy ing under the " j u s t cause" provisions of the Act . Just cause is 
defined as a job separation that is necessary due to the seriousness of actual 
or potent ial harm to the employer provided the claimant had knowledge of the 
employer's expectations and had control over the circumstances which led to 
the discharge. Just cause i s not established i f the reason for the discharge i s 
baseless, a rb i t ra ry or capricous or the employer has fa i l ed to uniformly apply 
reasonable standards to a l l employees when i n s t i t u t i n g d i sc ip l i na ry ac t ion . 
The purpose of th i s section i s to deny benef i ts to ind iv iduals who bring about 
the i r own unemployment by conducting themselves, with respect to t h e i r employment 
with callousness, misbehavior, or lack of consideration to such a degree that 
the empl oyer was j u s t i f i e d in discharging the employee. However, when an employee 
is discharged by his employer, such discharge may have been the resu l t of 
incompetence, lack of s k i l l , or other reasons which ar6 beyond the c la imant 's 
con t ro l . The question which must be established by the evidence is whether the 
claimant i s at f a u l t in his resu l t i ng unemployment. Unemployment insurance 
benef i ts w i l l be denied i f the employer had j u s t cause for discharging the 
employee. However, not e^ery cause for discharge provides a basis to deny 
benef i ts . In order to have j u s t cause for discharge pursuant to Section 35-4-
5(b)(1) there must be some f a u l t on the part of the employee involved. 
B. JUST CAUSE 
1. The basic factors which establish just cause, and are essential for a 
determination of ineligibility are: 
a. Culpability 
This is the seriousness of the conduct or the severity of the offense 
as it affects continuance of the employment relationship. The discharge must 
have been necessary to avoid actual or potential harm to the employer's rightful 
interests. A discharge would not be considered "necessary" if it is not consistent 
with reasonable employment practices. The wrongness of the conduct must be 
considered in the context of the particular employment and how it affects the 
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employer's rights. If the conduct was an isolated incident of poor judgment and 
there is no expectation that the conduct will be continued or repeated, potential 
harm may not be shown and therefore it 1s not necessary to discharge the employee. 
(1) Longevity and prior work record are Important 1n determining 1f 
the act or omission is an isolated incident or a good faith error in judgement. 
An employee who has historically complied with work rules does not demonstrate 
by a single violation, even though harmful, that such violations will be repeated 
and therefore require discharge to avoid future harm to the employer. For example: 
A long term employee who does not have a history of tardiness or absenteeism 1s 
absent without leave for a number of days due to a death in his immediate family. 
Although this is a violation of the employer's rules and may establish just 
cause for discharging a new employee, the fact that the employee has established 
over a long period of time that he complies with attendance rules shows that the 
circumstance is more of an isolated incident rather than a violation of the 
rules that is or could be exptected to be habitual. In this case, because 
the potential for harm to the employer is not shown, It 1s not necessary for the 
employer to discharge the employee, and therefore just cause is not established. 
b. Knowledge 
The employee must have had a knowledge of the conduct which the 
employer expected. It is not necessary that the claimant Intended to cause 
harm to the employer, but he should reasonably have been able to anticipate the 
effect his conduct would have. Knowledge may not be established unless the 
employer gave a clear explanation of the expected behavior or had a pertinent 
written policy, except in the case of a flagrant violation of a universal 
standard of behavior. If the employer's expectations are unclear, ambiguous 
or inconsistent, the existence of knowledge is not shown. A specific warning 
is one way of showing that the employee had knowledge of the expected conduct. 
After the employee is given a warning he should be given an opportunity to 
correct objectionable conduct. Additional violations occurring after the warn-
ing would be necessary to establish just cause for a discharge. 
(1) For Example: When the employer has an established procedure of 
progressive discipline, such procedures generally must have been followed in 
order to establish that the employee had knowledge of the expected behavior or 
the seriousness of the act. The exception is that wery severe conduct may justify 
immediate discharge without following a progressive disciplinary program. 
c. Control 
The conduct must have been within the power and capacity of the 
claimant to control or prevent. 
2. Just cause may not be established when the reason for discharge Is based 
on such things as mere mistakes, inefficiency, failure of performance as the 
result of inability or incapacity, inadvertence in isolated Instances, good-
faith errors in judgment or in the exercise of discretion, minor but casual or 
unintentional carelessness or negligence, etc. These examples of conduct are 
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alifying because of the lack of knowledge or control. However, contin-
I inefficiency, repeated carelessness, or lack of care exercised by ordinary, 
isonable workers in similar circumstances, may be disqualifying depending on 
» reason and degree of the carelessness, the knowledge and control of the 
)loyee. 
3, The term " j u s t cause" as used in Section 5(b)(1) does not lessen the 
luirement that there be some f a u l t on the part of the employee involved, 
ior to the 1983 addi t ion of the term " j us t cause" the Commission in terpreted 
: t i on 5(b)(1) to require an in tent iona l i n f l i c t i o n of harm or in ten t iona l 
sregard of the employer's i n te res ts . The in tent of the Legis lature in add-
g the words " j u s t cause" to Section 5(b)(1) was apparently to correct t h i s 
s t r i c t i v e i n te rp re ta t i on . While some f a u l t must be present, i t is s u f f i c i e n t 
at the acts were intended, the consequences were reasonably foreseeable, and 
at such acts have serious e f fec t on the employee's job or the employer's 
te res ts . 
BURDEN OF PROOF 
1 . In a discharge, the employer i n i t i a t e s the separation and, as such, i s 
le primary source of information with regard to the reasons for the d ismissal . 
\e employer has the burden of proof which is the respons ib i l i t y to establ ish 
le facts resu l t ing in the discharge. The employer i s required by the Statute 
I Section 35-4 - l l (g ) to keep accurate records and to provide correct informa-
lon to the Department for proper administrat ion of the Act. Although the 
nployer has the burden to establ ish j u s t cause for the discharge, i f s u f f i c i e n t 
acts are obtained from the claimant, a decision w i l l be made based on the 
i formation ava i lab le . The f a i l u r e of one party to provide information does 
ot necessari ly resu l t i n a ru l i ng favorable to the other par ty . 
2. A l l interested par t ies have the r i g h t to give rebut ta l to information 
ontrary to the in teres ts of that par ty . 
QUIT OR DISCHARGE 
he determination of whether a separation is a qu i t or a discharge is made by the 
epartment based on the circumstances which resul ted in the separat ion. The 
onclusions on the employer's records, the separation notice or the c la imant 's 
eport are not con t ro l l i ng on the Department. 
1 . Discharge Before Ef fect ive Date of Resignation. 
When an indiv idual n o t i f i e s an employer that he intends to leave as of a 
l e f i n i t e date in the future and is discharged p r i o r to that date, the cause for 
.he separation on the day the separation takes place is the c o n t r o l l i n g fac tor 
in determining whether i t was a qu i t or discharge. Although the separation 
night have been motivated by the c la imant 's announced res ignat ion, the employer 
•/as the moving party in ending the employment p r io r to the resignat ion date, 
rherefore, the immediate reason was more closely re lated to the employer's 
action than to the c la imant 's announced in ten t ion to q u i t . Unless d isqua l i f y ing 
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conduct is involved, the separation is considered to be for the convenience of 
the employer. However, if the employee is merely relieved of work responsibly 
lities but is paid through the date of his announced resignation, it is not 
a discharge, but a quit. 
2. Leaving In Anticipation of Discharge. 
When an employee leaves work in anticipation of a possible discharge or 
layoff, and if the reason for the discharge would not be disqualifying, the sep-
aration is generally considered to be a voluntary quit. However, an Individual 
who leaves work to avoid virtually certain discharge for disqualifying conduct 
cannot thereby avoid the disqualifying provisions of Section 35-4-5(b), and 
the separation is considered a discharge rather than voluntary leaving. 
3. Employee Knows His Action Will Result in Discharge 
Absences taken without permission, or other actions contrary to specific 
unreasonable instructions from the employer, are generally considered a volun-
tary separation rather than discharge, if the worker was given a choice of 
complying or being separated. 
E. DISCIPLINARY SUSPENSION OR INVOLUNTARY FURLOUGH 
When an employee is put on a disciplinary suspension or involuntary fur-
lough, he may meet the definition of "unemployed". If the claimant files 
during the suspension or furlough, the reason for the suspension or furlough 
must be adjudicated as a discharge, even though the claimant is still attached 
to the employer and expects to return to work. A suspension which was reason-
able and necessary to prevent potential harm to the employer or to maintain 
necessary dicipline would generally result in a disqualification under this 
section provided the elements of control and knowledge are present. Failure 
to return to work at the end of the definite period of suspension or furlough 
would be considered a voluntary quit and eligibility would then be determined 
consistent with Section 35-4-5(a), if the claimant had not been previously 
denied. 
F. PROXIMAL CAUSE ~ Relation of Offense to Discharge 
1. The cause for discharge is that conduct which motivates the employer to 
make the decision to terminate the employee's services. If the decision has 
truly been made, it is generally demonstrated by way of notice to the employee 
or the initiation of a personnel action. Although the employer may learn of 
other offenses following the making of the decision to terminate, the reason 
for the discharge is limited to that conduct of which the employer was aware 
prior to making the decision. However, if the employer discharges a person 
because of some preliminary evidence of certain conduct, but does not obtain 
all of the proof of the conduct until after the separation notice is given, it 
could still be concluded that the discharge was caused by that conduct which 
the employer was investigating. Eligibility for benefits will then be deter-
mined by considering the extent of culpability, knowledge and control. 
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2. When the discharge does not occur Immediately a f te r the employer becomes 
are of an offense, a presumption arises that there were other reasons for the 
scharge. This re la t ionsh ip between the offense and the discharge must be 
tablished both as to cause and t ime. The presumption that the conduct was 
t the cause of the discharge may be overcome by a showing that the delay was 
3 to such things as inves t iga t ion , a r b i t r a t i o n , or hearings conducted wi th 
gard to the employee's conduct. When a grievance or a r b i t r a t i o n i s pending 
th respect to the discharge, the Department's decision w i l l be based on the 
formation avai lable to the Department. The Department's decision i s not 
nding on the grievance resolut ion process or an a rb i t r a to r and the decision 
the a rb i t r a to r is not binding on the Department. When an employer i s faced 
th the necessity of a reduction in his workforce but uses an employee's p r i o r 
nduct as the c r i t e r i a for determining who w i l l be layed o f f , the lack of work 
the primary motivat ion or cause of the discharge, not the conduct. 
IN CONNECTION WITH EMPLOYMENT 
Disqual i fy ing conduct is not l im i ted to offenses which take place on the 
iployer's premises or during business hours. I t Is only necessary that the 
nduct have such "connection" to the employee's duties and to the employer's 
siness that i t i s a subject of leg i t imate and s i gn i f i can t concern to the 
iployer. A l l employers, both public and pr ivate have the r i gh t to expect 
iployees to re f ra in from acts which are detrimental to the business or would 
ing dishonor on the business name or the i n s t i t u t i o n . Legit imate In terests 
employers inc lude, but are not l im i ted t o : goodwill of customers, reputa-
on of the business, e f f i c i ency , business costs, morale of employees, d i s c i -
ine , honesty, t r u s t and l o y a l t y . 
EXAMPLES OF REASONS FOR DISCHARGE 
\ a l l the fo l lowing examples, the basic elements of j u s t cause must be consid-
*ed in determining e l i g i b i l i t y for bene f i t s . The fo l lowing examples do not 
lclude a l l reasons for discharge. 
1 . V io la t ion of Company Rules 
an employee v io la tes reasonable rules of the employer and the three elements 
c u l p a b i l i t y , knowledge and control are establ ished, benef i ts must be denied. 
a. The reasonableness of the employer's rules w i l l depend on the neces-
i ty for such a rule as i t a f fects the employer's i n te res t s . Rules which are 
3ntrary to general publ ic pol icy or which in f r inge upon the recognized r igh ts 
id pr iv i leges of ind iv idua ls may not be reasonable. An employer must have 
roader prerogatives in regulat ing conduct when employees are on the job than 
len they are not. An employer must be able to make rules for employee on-the-
3b conduct that reasonably fur ther the leg i t imate business in terests of the 
uployer. An employer is not required to Impose only minimum standards, but 
here may be some j u s t i f i a b l e cause for v io la t ions of rules that are unreasonable 
r unduly harsh, r igorous or exact ing. When rules are changed, adequate not ice 
nd reasonable opportunity to comply must be af forded. I f the employee believes 
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a rule is unreasonable, he has the responsibility to discuss his concerns with 
the employer and give the employer an opportunity to take corrective action; 
b. Discharges may be regulated by an employment contract or collective 
bargaining agreement. Just cause for the discharge is not established if the 
employee's conduct was consistent with his rights under such contract or the 
discharge was contrary to the provisions of such contract. 
c. Habitual offenses may not be disqualifying conduct if it is found 
that the act was condoned by the employer or was so prevalent as to be customary. 
However, when the worker is given notice that the conduct will no longer be 
tolerated, further violations could result in a denial of benefits, 
d
* Culpability may be established even if the result of the violation of 
the rule does not in and of itself cause harm to the employer, but the resultant 
lack of compliance with rules diminishes the employer's ability to have order 
and control. Culpability is established if termination of the employee was 
required to maintain necessary discipline in the company. 
e
* Knowledge of the employer's standards of behavior is usually provi-
ded in the form of verbal instructions, written rules and/or warnings. However, 
a warning is not always necessary for a disqualification to apply in cases of 
violations of a serious nature of universal standards of conduct of which the 
claimant should have been aware without being warned. 
2. Attendance Violations 
a. It is the duty of the worker to be punctual and remain at work within 
the reasonable requirements of the employer. Discharge for unjustified absence 
or tardiness is considered disqualifying if the worker knows that he is viola-
ting attendance rules. Such violations are generally a serious matter of con-
cern to employers as attendance standards are necessary to maintain order, 
control, and productivity. Discharge for an attendance violation beyond the 
control of the worker is not disqualifying unless the worker reasonably could 
have given notice or obtained permission consistent with the employer's rules. 
b. In cases of termination for violations of attendance standards, the 
employee's recent history of attendance shall be considered to determine if the 
violation is an isolated incident, or demonstrates a pattern of unjustified 
absences within the control of the employee. Flagrant misuse of attendance 
privileges may result in a denial of benefits even if the last incident was 
beyond the employee's control. 
3. Falsification of Work Record 
The duty of honesty is inherent in any employee/employer relationship, 
A statement made in an application for a job may be considered as connected 
with the work, even though it is made before the work begins. An individual 
begins his obligations as an employee when he makes an application for work. 
One of those obligations is to give the employer truthful answers to all 
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aterial questions. Any falsification of information which may operate to 
xpose the employer to possible loss, litigation, or damage would be considered 
aterial and therefore may establish culpability. If the claimant made a 
alse statement while applying for work in order to be hired, benefits may be 
enied even if the claimant would have otherwise remained unemployed and 
ligible for the receipt of unemployment benefits depending upon the degree of 
nowledge, culpability and control. 
4. Insubordination 
Authority is required in the work place to maintain order and efficiency, 
n employer has the right to expect that lines of authority will be maintained; 
hat reasonable orders, given in a civil manner, will be obeyed; that supervisors 
ill be respected and that their authority will not be undermined. In deter-
ining when insubordination (resistance to authority) becomes disqualifying 
onduct, the fact that there was a disregard of the employer's interests is of 
ajor importance. Mere protests or dissatisfaction without an overt act is not 
n disregard of the employer's interests. However, provocative remarks to a 
uperior or vulgar or profane language in response to a civil request may be 
nsubordination if it is conducive to disruption of routine, negation of author-
ty and impairment of efficiency. Mere incompatability or emphatic insistence 
r discussion by an employee who was acting in good faith is not disqualifying 
onduct. 
5. Loss of License 
When an employee loses a license which he knows is required for the 
erformance of the job, and the individual had control over the circumstances 
hich resulted in the loss of the license, such conduct is disqualifying. For 
xample, if the claimant worked as a driver, and lost his license because of a 
onviction for driving under the influence (DUI), culpability is established 
f he fails to obtain a permit to drive at work or the conviction would expose 
he employer to additional liabilities. The employer cannot authorize an 
mployee to drive in violation of the law. Also, additional insurance costs or 
ther liabilities are a legitimate concern of the employer. Knowledge is 
stablished because it is a matter of common knowledge in the state of Utah 
hat driving under the influence of alcohol is a violation of the law and is 
unishable by loss of the individual's driving privileges. Judicial notice can 
e taken of this fact because a question relative to this matter is on eyery 
river's license test. He had control in that he made a conscious decision to 
isk loss of the license when he failed to make arrangements for transportation 
rior to becoming under the influence of intoxicants. 
. EFFECTIVE DATE OF DISQUALIFICATION 
The Act provides that any disqualification under this section will include 
the week in which the claimant was discharged . • ." However, to avoid con-
usion, the denial of benefits will begin with the Sunday of the week for which 
he claimant has filed for benefits. 
ederal Highway Administration, DOT § 395.2 
terns 27 through 27B: Mark appropriate 
boxes to Indicate road surface condition, 
number of lanes, and If the highway was 
divided by a median or curbing. 
Rem 27C: Mark appropriate box. 
Item 28: An account of the accident con-
taining the most reliable Information to 
which the motor carrier has access at 
the time of reporting, sufficiently de-
tailed and complete to convey an under-
standing of his version of the accident 
shall be entered under this Item. This 
account should be continued on an extra 
sheet of paper If more space if needed. 
Item 29: JPrint or type name and title of 
person signing report. 
Items 30, 31 and 32: Complete appropriate 
entries. In Item 31 include area code. 
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PART 395—HOURS OF SERVICE OF 
DRIVERS 
See. 
395.1 CompHance with, and knowledge of, 
the rules In this part. 
395.2 Definitions. 
395.3 Maximum driving and on-duty time. 
395.7 Travel time. 
395.8 Driver's record of duty status. 
395.10 Adverse driving conditions. 
395.11 Emergency conditions. 
395.12 Relief from regulations. 
395.13 Drivers declared out c* service. 
AUTHORITY: Sec. 204. 49 Stat. 546, as 
amended; 49 U.S.C. 304, unless otherwise 
noted. 
SOURCE: 33 FR 19758, Dec. 25, 1968, unless 
otherwise noted. 
§395.1 CompHance with, and knowledge 
of, the rules in this part. 
(a) General Except as provided In 
paragraph (b) of this section, every 
motor carrier and Its officers, drivers, 
agents, employees, and representatives 
shall comply with the rules In this 
part, and every motor carrier shall re-
quire that Its officers, drivers, agents, 
employees, and representatives be con-
versant with the rules in this part. 
(b) Lightweight mail tntcks. 7 i ie 
rules In this part do not apply to a 
driver who drives only a motor vehicle 
that— 
(1) Is used exclusively to transport 
mail under contract with the U.S. 
Postal Service; and 
(2) Has a manufacturer's gross vehi-
cle weight rating of 10,000 pounds or 
less. 
[37 FR 26113, Dec. 8, 1972] 
§ 395.2 Definitions. 
As used In this part, the following 
words and terms are construed to 
mean: 
(a) On-duty time. All time from the 
time a driver begins to work or Is re-
quired to be in readiness to work until 
the time he is relieved from work and 
all responsibility for performing work. 
The term "On-duty" time shall In-
clude: 
(1) All time at a carrier or shipper 
plant, terminal, facility, or other prop-
erty, or on any public property, wait-
ing to be dispatched, unless the driver 
has been relieved from duty by the 
motor carrier. 
(2) All time inspecting equipment as 
required by §§ 392.7 and 392.8 or oth-
erwise inspecting, servicing, or condi-
tioning any motor vehicle at any time; 
(3) All driving time as defined In 
paragraph (b) of this section; 
(4) All time, other than driving time, 
In or upon any motor vehicle except 
time spent resting in a sleeper berth as 
defined in paragraph (g) of this sec-
tion; 
(5) All time loading or unloading a 
vehicle, supervising, or assisting In the 
loading or unloading, attending a vehi-
cle being loaded or unloaded, remain-
ing in readiness to operate the vehicle, 
or in giving or receiving receipts for 
shipments loaded or unloaded; 
(6) All time spent performing the 
driver requirements of §§392.40 and 
392.41 relating to accidents; 
(7) All time repairing, obtaining as-
sistance, or remaining In attendance 
upon a disabled vehicle; 
(8) Performing any other work in 
the capacity of, or in the employ or 
service of, a common, contract or pri-
vate motor carrier. 
(b) Driving time. The terms "drive" 
and "driving time" shall include all 
time spent at the driving controls of a 
motor vehicle in operation. 
(c) Seven consecutive days. The term 
"7 consecutive days" means the period 
of 7 consecutive days beginning on any 
day at the time designated by the 
motor carrier for a 24-hour period. 
(d) Eight consecutive days. The term 
"8 consecutive days" means the period 
of 8 consecutive days beginning on any 
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it the time designated by the 
carrier for a 24-hour period. 
Twenty-four hour period. The 
"24-hour period" means any 24 
3utive hour period beginning at 
me designated by the motor car-
or the terminal from which the 
is normally dispatched. 
Regularly employed driver. The 
"regularly employed dilver" 
i a driver who in any period of 7 
Mitlve days is employed or used 
jrlver solely by a single motor 
r. 
Weeper beith. The term "sleeper 
means a berth conforming to 
>quirements of § 393.76 of this 
ipter. 
Driver-salesman. The trim 
r salesman" means any employ-
) Is employed solely as such by a 
2 cairier of property by motor 
3, who Is engaged both in selling 
services, or the use of goods, 
delivering by motor vehicle the 
sold or provided or upon which 
rvices are performed, who does 
rely within a radius of 100 miles 
point at which he reports for 
who devotes not more than 50 
t of his hours on duty to driving 
The term "selling goods" for 
;es of this subsection shall in-
n all cases solicitation or obtain-
reorders or new accounts, and 
Iso include other selling or mer-
slng activities designed to retain 
stomer or to Increase the snle of 
or services, In addition to solicl-
or obtaining of reorders or new 
its. 
r
ultiple stops. All stops made In 
»e village, town, or city may be 
ted as one. 
Principal place of business or 
office addtess. The pilncipal 
of business or main office ad-
s the geographic location deslg-
by the motor carrier where the 
; required to be maintained by 
rt will be made available for In-
n. 
!.C. 304, 1653; 49 CFR 1.48 and 
19758, Dec. 25, 1968, as amended at 
46424, July 10, 1980; 47 FJR 53389, 
1982J 
§395.3 Maximum driving and on-duty 
time. 
(a) Except as provided in paragraphs 
(c) and (e) of this section and in 
§ 395.10, no motor carrier shall permit 
or require any driver used by it to 
drive nor shall any such driver drive: 
(1) More than 10 hours following 8 
consecutive hours off duty; or 
(2) For any period after having been 
on duty 15 hours following 8 consecu-
tive hours off duty. 
(3) Exemption: Drivers using sleepe 
berth equipment as defined it 
5 395.2(g), or who are off duty at a nat 
ural gas or oil well location, may cu 
mulate the required 8 consecutiv< 
hours off duty resting In a sleepei 
berth In two separate periods totaling 
8 hours, neither period to be less thar 
2 hours, or resting while off duty ir 
other sleeping accommodations at i 
natural gas or oil well location. 
(b) Except as provided In paragraph 
(e) of this section, no motor carriei 
shall permit or require any driver used 
by it to be on duty, nor shall any sucli 
driver be on duty, more than 60 hours 
in any 7 consecutive days as defined In 
§ 395.2(c) regardless of the number oi 
motor carriers using the driver's serv-
ices. Provided, however, That carriers 
operating vehicles every day in the 
week may permit drivers to remain on 
duty for a total of not more than 70 
hours in any period of 8 consecutive 
days. Provided further, however, That 
the limitations of this paragraph shall 
not apply with respect to any driver-
salesman whose total driving time does 
not exceed 40 hours In any 7 consecu-
tive days. 
(c) The provisions of paragraph (a) 
of this section shall not apply with re-
spect to drivers used wholly in driving 
motor vehicles having not more than 2 
axles and whose gross weight, as de-
fined in § 390.10, does not exceed 
10,000 pounds, unless such vehicle Is 
used to transport passengers or explo-
sives or other dangerous article"? of 
such type and In such quantity as to 
require the vehicle to be specifically 
marked or placarded under the Haz-
ardous Materials Regulations, 
§ 177.823 of this title, or when operat-
ed without cargo under conditions 
which require the vehicle to be so 
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marked or placarded under the cited 
regulations: Provided further, however, 
That this section shall not apply with 
respect to drivers of motor vehicles en-
gaged solely in making deliveries for 
retail stores during the period from 
December 10 to December 25, both in-
clusive, of each year. 
(d) In the Instance of drivers of 
motor vehicles used exclusively in the 
transportation ot oilfield equipment, 
including the stringing and picking up 
of pipe used in pipelines, and servicing 
of the field operations of the natural 
gas and oil industry, any period of 8 
consecutive days may end with the be-
ginning of any off-duty period of 24 or 
more successive hours. 
(e) A driver who Is driving a motor 
vehicle in the State of Alaska must 
not drive or be permitted to drive 
more than 15 hours following 8 con-
secutive hours off duty. A driver who 
is driving a motor vehicle in the State 
of Alaska must not drive or be permit-
ted to drive after he has been on duty 
for 20 hours or more following 8 con-
secutive hours off duty. A driver who 
drives a motor vehicle in the State of 
Alaska must not be on duty or be per-
mitted to be on duty more than— 
(1) 70 hours in any period of 7 con-
secutive days, If the carrier for whom 
he drives does not opeiate every day In 
the week; or 
(2) 80 hours in any period of 8 con-
secutive days, If the carrier for whom 
he drives operates every day in the 
week. 
(f) In the case of specially trained 
drivers of specially constructed oil well 
servicing vehicles, on-duty time shall 
not include waiting time at a natural 
gas or oil well site; Provided, That all 
such time shall fully and accurately 
accounted for In records to be main-
tained by the motor carrier. Such 
records shall be made available upon 
request of the Federal Highway Ad-
ministration. 
[33 FR 10758, Dec. 25, 1060, as amended at 
36 FR 20360, Oct. 21, 1071; 45 FH 46424 and 
46425, July 10, 1080J 
§395.7 Travel time. 
When a driver at the direction of a 
motor carrier Is traveling, but not driv-
ing or assuming any other responsibil-
ity to the carrier, such time shall be 
counted as on-duty time unless the 
driver is afforded at least 8 consecu-
tive hours off duty when arriving at 
destination, in which case he shall be 
considered off duty for the entire 
period. 
§ 395.8 Driver's record of duty status. 
(a) Every motor carrier shall require 
every driver used by the motor carrier 
to record his/her duty status, in dupli-
cate, for each 24-hour period. Every 
driver who operates a motor vehicle 
shall record his/her duty status, in du-
plicate, for each 24-hour period. The 
duty status time shall be recorded on a 
specified grid, as shown in paragraph 
(g) of this section. The grid and the re-
quirements of paragraph (d) of this 
section may be combined with any 
company forms. The previously ap-
proved format of the Daily Log, Form 
MCS-59 or the Multi-day Log, MCS-
139 and MCS-139A, which meets the 
requirements of this paragraph, may 
continue to be used. 
(b) The duty status shall be recorded 
as follows: 
(1) "Off duty" or "OFF." 
(2) "Sleeper berth" or "SB" (only if 
a sleeper berth used). 
(3) "Driving" or "D." 
(4) "On-duty not driving" or "ON." 
(c) For each change of duty status 
(e.g., the place of reporting for work, 
starting to drive, on-duty not driving 
and where released from work), the 
name of the city, town, or village, with 
State abbreviation, shall be recorded. 
NOTE: If a change of duty status occurs at 
a location other than a city, town, or village, 
show one of the following: (1) The highway 
number and nearest mllepost followed by 
the name of the nearest city, town, or vil-
lage and State abbreviation, (2) the highway 
number and the name of the service plaza 
followed by the name of the nearest city, 
town, or village and State abbreviation, or 
(3) the highway numbers of the nearest two 
Intersecting roadways followed by the name 
of the nercst city, town, or village and State 
abbreviation. 
(d) The following Information must 
be included on the form in addition to 
the grid: 
( l ) D a t e ; 
(2) Total miles driving today; 
(3) Truck or tractor and trailer 
number; 
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ne of carrier; 
ver's signature/certification; 
hour period starting time (e.g. 
t, 9:00 a.m., noon, 3:00 p.m.); 
In office address; 
narks; 
,al mileage today; 
ime of co-driver; 
mie terminal address; 
otal hours (far right edge of 
lipping document number(s), 
of shipper and commodity; 
Jgln; and 
Destination or turnaround 
i 
lure to complete the record of 
Ivltles, failure to preserve a 
>f such duty activities, or 
)f false reports In connection 
ti duty activities as prescribed 
ball make the driver and/or 
er liable to prosecution. 
> driver's activities shall be re-
I accordance with the follow-
slons: 
tries to be current. Drivers 
p their record of duty status 
o the time shown for the last 
f duty status. 
tics made by driver only. All 
Anting to driver's duty status 
eglble and In the driver's own 
Ing. 
e. The month, day and year 
beginning of each 24-hour 
mil be shown on the form 
g the driver's duty status 
xl mileage diiven. Total mlle-
n during the 24-hour period 
ecorded on the form contain-
river's duty status record. 
icle identification. The carri-
ole number or State and 11-
imber of each truck, truck 
md trailer operated dining 
our period shall be shown on 
containing the driver's duty 
ord. 
ie of carrier. The name(s) of 
r carrler(s) for which work is 
d shnll be shown on the form 
g the driver's duty status 
/hen work is performed for 
n one motor carrier during 
24-hour period, the begin-
finlshing time, showing a.m. 
vorked for each carrier shall 
be shown after each carrier name. 
Drivers of leased vehicles shall show 
the name of the motor carrier per-
forming the transportation. 
(7) Signatui e/cei tification. The 
driver shall certify to the correctness 
of all entries by signing the form con-
taining the driver's duty status record 
with his/her legal name or name of 
record. The driver's signature certifies 
that all entries required by this sec-
tion made by the driver are true and 
correct. 
(8) Time base to be used, (i) The driv-
er's duty status record shall be pre-
pared, maintained, and submitted 
using the time standard in effect at 
the driver's home terminal, for a 24-
hour period beginning with the time 
specified by the motor carrier for that 
driver's home terminal. 
(li) The term "7 or 8 consecutive 
days" means the 7 or 8 consecutive 24-
hour periods as designated by the car-
rier for the driver's home terminal. 
(ill) The 24-hour period starting time 
must be identified on the driver's duty 
status record. One-hour increments 
must appear on the giaph, be Identi-
fied, and preprinted. The words "Mid-
night" and "Noon" must appear above 
or beside the appropriate one-hour in-
crement. 
(9) Main office address. The motor 
carrier's main office address shall be 
shown on the form containing the 
driver's duty status record. 
(10) Recording days off duty. Two or 
more consecutive 24-hour periods off 
duty may be recorded on one duty 
status record. 
(11) Total mileage today. Total mile-
age today shall be that mileage trav-
eled while driving, on duty not driving, 
and resting in a sleeper berth, as de-
fined in S 395.2(g) during the day cov-
ered by the record of duty status. 
(12) Home teiinlnal The driver's 
home terminal address shown shall be 
that at which the driver normally re-
ports for duty. 
(13) Total hours. The total hours In 
each duty status: off duty other than 
in a sleeper berth; off duty in a sleeper 
berth; driving, and on duty not driv-
ing, shall be entered to the right of 
the grid, the total of such entries shall 
equal 24 hours. 
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(14) Shipping document number(s), 
or name of shipper and commodity 
shall be shown on the driver's record 
of duty status. 
(15) OHgin and destination. The 
name of the place where a trip begins 
and the final destination or farthest 
turn-around point shall be shown. If 
the trip requires more than 1 calendar 
day, the record of duty status for each 
day shall show the original and final 
destination. If a driver departs from 
and returns to the same place on any 
day, the destination shall be Indicated 
by entering the farthest point reached 
followed by the words "and return". 
(g) Graph grid. The following graph 
grid must be Incorporated Into a motor 
carrier recordkeeping system which 
must also contain the Information re-
quired In paragraph (d) of this section1. * 
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(h) Graph grid preparation. The 
graph grid may be used horizontally 
or vertically and shall be completed as 
follows: 
(1) Off duly. Except for time spent 
resting In a sleeper beith, a continu-
ous line shall be drawn between the 
appropilate time markers to record 
the peilod(s) of time when the driver 
Is not on duty, Is not required to be In 
readiness to work, or Is not under any 
responsibility for performing work. 
(2) Sleeper berlh. A continuous line 
shall be drawn between the appropil-
ate time maikers to record the 
period(s) of time off duty resting In a 
sleeper berth, as defined In § 395.2(g). 
(If a non sleeper berth operation, 
sleeper berth need not be shown on 
the grid.) 
(3) Driving. A continuous line shall 
be dtawn between the appropilate 
time markers to recoid the peiiod(s) 
of time on duty driving a motor vehi-
cle, as defined In § 395 2(b). 
(4) On duly not driving. A continu-
ous line shall be diawn between the 
appropilate time markers to recoid 
the perlod(s) of time on duty not driv-
ing specified In § 395.2(a). 
(5) Location—remarks. The name of 
the city, town, or village, with State 
abbreviation where each change of 
duty status occurs shall be recorded. 
NOTF* If a change of duty status occurs at 
a location other than a city, town, or village, 
show one of the following: (1) The highway 
number and nearest mllepost followed by 
the name of the nearest city, town, or vil-
lage and State abbreviation, (2) the highway 
number and the name of the service plaza 
followed by the name of the nearest city, 
town, or village and State abbreviation, or 
(3) the highway numbers of the nearest two 
intersecting roadways followed by the name 
of the nearest city, town, or village and 
State abbreviation. 
(I) Filing driver's record of duty 
status. The dilver shall submit or for-
ward by mall the original diiver's 
record of duty status to the regular 
employing motor carrier within 13 
days following the completion of the 
form. 
(J) Drivers used by more than one 
motor carrier. (1) When the services of 
a driver are used by more than one 
motor cariler duiing any 24-hour 
period In effect at the driver's home 
§ 395.8 
terminal, the driver shall submit a 
copy of the record of duty status to 
each motor carrier. The record shall 
include: 
(i) All duty time for the entire 24-
hour period; , 
(ii) The name of each motor carrier 
served by the driver during that 
period; and K l 
(ill) The beginning and finishing 
time, including a.m. or p.m., worked 
for each carrier. 
(2) Motor caniers, when using a 
driver for the first time or intermit-
tently, shall obtain from the driver a 
signed statement giving the total time 
on duty during the immediately pre-
ceding 7 days and the time at which 
the driver was last relieved from duty 
prior to beginning work for the motor 
carrieis. 
(k) Retention of driver's record of 
duty status. (1) Diiver's records of 
duty status for each calendar month 
may be retained at the driver's home 
terminal until the 20th day of the suc-
ceeding calendar month. Such records 
shall then be forwarded to the carri-
er's principal place of business where 
they shall be retained with all sup-
p o s i n g documents for a period of 6 
months from date of receipt. 
(2) Exception. Upon written request 
to, and with the approval of, the Asso-
ciate Regional Administrator for 
Motor Carrier Safety for the region in 
which the motor carrier has its prlncl 
pal place of business, a motor carriei 
may forward and maintain sucli 
records at a regional or termlna 
office. The addresses and jurisdiction.' 
of the Associate Regional Admlnlstra 
tor's offices are shown in 5 390.40 o 
this subchapter. 
(3) The driver shall retain a copy o 
each record of duty status for the pre 
vious 7 consecutive days which shal 
be in his/her possession and avallabl 
for inspection while on duty. 
NOTE: Driver's Record of Duty Status. 
The graph grid, when Incorporated as pa 
of any form used by a motor carrier, tnu 
be of sufficient size to be legible. 
The following executed specimen grid 
lustrates how a driver's duty status shou 
be recorded for a trip from Richmond, VI 
glnla, to Newark, New Jersey. The grid t 
fleets the midnight to midnight 24 ho 
period. 
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f 10 t l MOON 1 
Id (Midnight to Midnight 
Operation) 
n t!ds Instance reported for 
lotor carrier's terminal. The 
I for work at 8 a.m., helped 
villi dispatch, made a pretrlp 
performed other duties until 
the driver began driving. At 
/er hnd a minor accident In 
Virginia, and spent one half 
details with the local police. 
Ivcd at the company's Baltl-
i, terminal at noon and went 
minor repairs were made to 
, 1 p.m. the driver resumed 
lade a delivery In Phlladel-
tnla, between 3 p.m. and 3:30 
me the driver started driving 
rrlval at Cherry Hill, New 
m., the driver entered the 
>r a rest break until 5:45 p.m. 
the driver resumed driving 
n. the driver arrived at the 
ilnal In Newaik, New Jersey. 
and 8 p.m. the driver pre-
ulred paperwork Including 
; driver's record of duty 
condition report, Insurance 
Yederlcksburg, Virginia accl-
or the next day's dispatch, 
ie driver went off duty. 
fott$—(l) 100 air-mile 
A d i iver Is e x e m p t f rom 
nts of this section If: 
er operates within a 100 
3 of the normal work re-
>n; 
er, except a driver sales-
is to the work reporting 
Is released from work 
8 consecutive hours off 
each 12 hours on duty; 
(lv) The driver does not exceed 10 
hours maximum dilvlng time follow-
ing 8 consecutive hours off duty; 
(v) The motor carrier that employs 
the driver maintains and retains for a 
period of 6 months accurate and true 
time records showing: 
(A) The time the driver reports for 
duty each day; 
(B) The total number of hours the 
driver Is on duty each day; 
(C) The time the driver Is released 
from duty each day; and 
(D) The total time for the preceding 
7 days In accordnnce with paragraph 
(j)(2) of this section for drivers used 
for the first time or Intermittently. 
(2) Drivers of lightweight vehicles. 
The rules In this section do not apply 
to a driver of a lightweight vehicle as 
defined In § 390.17. 
(3) Drivers operating in Hawaii. The 
rules In this section do not apply to a 
driver who drives a motor vehicle in 
the State of Hawaii, if the motor carri-
er who employs the driver maintains 
and retains for a period of 6 months 
accurate and true records showing— 
(i) The total number of hours the 
driver is on duty each day; and 
(ii) The time at which the driver re-
ports for, and Is released, from, duty 
each day. 
(Approved by the Office of Management 
and Budget under control number 2125-
0018) 
(40 U.S.C. 304, 1853; 49 CFU 1.48 and 301,80; 
40 U.S.C. 3102; 40 CFU 1.48(b)) 
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[47 FR 53389, Nov. 26, 1982, as amended at 
49 mi 38290, Sept. 28, 1984; 49 FR 46147, 
Nov. 23, 1984J 
6 395.10 Adverse driving conditions. 
(a) Except as provided in paragraph 
(b) of this section, a driver who en-
counters adverse driving conditions (as 
defined in paragraph (c) of this sec-
tion) and cannot, because of those con-
ditions, safely complete the run within 
the 10 hour maximum driving time 
permitted by 9 395.3(a) may drive and 
be permitted or required to drive a 
motor vehicle for not more than 2 ad-
ditional hours in order to complete 
that run or to reach a place offering 
safety for vehicle occupants and secu-
rity for the vehicle and lis cargo. How-
ever, that driver may not drive or be 
permitted or requited to drive— 
(1) For more than 12 hours in the 
aggregate following 8 consecutive 
hours off duty; or 
(2) After he has been on duty 15 
hours following 8 consecutive hours 
off duty. 
(b) A driver who Is driving a motor 
vehicle in the State of Alaska and who 
encounters adverse driving conditions 
(as defined In paragraph (c) of this 
section) may drive and be permitted or 
required to drive a motor vehicle for 
the period of time needed to complete 
the run. After he completes the run, 
that driver must be off duty for 8 con-
secutive hours before he drives again. 
(c) "Adverse driving conditions" 
means snow, sleet, fog, other adverse 
weather conditions, a highway covered 
with snow or Ice, or unusual road and 
traffic conditions, none of which were 
apparent on the basis of Information 
known to the person dispatching the 
run at the time it was begun. 
[38 FR 1590, Jan. 18, 19731 
§395.11 Emergency conditions. 
In case of any emergency, a driver 
may complete his run without being In 
violation of the provisions of these 
regulations, if such run could reason-
ably have been completed without 
such violation. 
§ 395.12 Relief from regulations. 
These regulations shall not apply to 
any carrier subject thereto when 
transporting passengers or property to 
or from any section of the country 
with the object of providing relief in 
case of earthquake, flood, fire. 'amine, 
drought, epidemic, pestilence, or other 
calamitous visitation or disaster. 
§ 395.13 Drivers declared out of service. 
(a) Authority to declare drivers out 
of service. Every special agent of the 
Federal Highway Administration (as 
defined In Appendix B to this sub-
chapter) is authorized to declare a 
driver out of service and to notify the 
motor carrier of that declaration, 
upon finding at the time and place of 
examination that the driver has violat-
ed the out of service criteria as set 
forth in paragraph (b) of this section. 
(b) Out of service criteria. (1) No 
driver shall drive after being on duty 
in excess of the maximum periods per-
mitted by this part. 
(2) )$o driver required to maintain a 
record of duty status under J 395 8 
shall fail to have a record of duty 
status current on the day of examina-
tion and for the prior 7 consecutive 
days. 
(3) Exception, A driver falling only 
to have possession of a record of duty 
status current on the day of exarnina 
tion and the prior day, but has com 
pleted records of duty status up tc 
that time (previous 6 days), will be 
given the opportunity to make the 
duty status record current. 
(c) Responsibilities of motor carri 
eis. (1) No motor carrier shall: 
(i) Require or permit a driver whe 
has been declared out of service to op 
erate a motor vehicle until that drive) 
may lawfully do under the rules h 
this part. 
(II) Require a driver who has beer 
declared out of service for failure t< 
prepare a record of duty status to op 
erate a motor vehicle until that drive 
has been off duty for 8 consecutiv 
hours and Is in compliance with thi 
section. The consecutive 8 hour of! 
duty period may include sleeper bertl 
time. 
(2) A motor carrier shall complet 
the "Motor Carrier Certification c 
Action Taken" portion of the forr 
MCS-63 (Driver-Vehicle Examinatio 
Report) and deliver the copy of th 
form either personally or by mail t 
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sociatc Regional Administrator 
otor Cnrrier Safety, Federal 
\y Administration, at the ad-
pccifled upon the form within 
following the date of examina-
F the motor canier mails the 
olivery is made on the date it is 
rked. 
csponsibilities of the driver. (1) 
'er who has been declared out 
Ice shall operate a motor vehi-
il that driver may lawfully do 
r the rules of this part, 
i driver who has been declared 
service, for foiling to prepare a 
of duty status, shall opeiate a 
vehicle until the driver has 
f duty for 8 consecutive houts 
i compliance with this section. 
driver to whom a form has 
idercd declaring the driver out 
:e shall within 24 hours there-
Oliver or mail the copy to a 
or place designated by motor 
o receive it. 
ction 395.13 does not alter the 
us materials requirements pre-
In § 397.5 peitaining to attend-
d surveillance of motor vehi-
304, 1655(e); 49 CFR 1.48 and 
1963, June 18, 1979, as amended at 
192, Nov. 26, 1982] 
396—INSPECTION, REPAIR, 
AND MAINTENANCE 
>pe. 
pcctlon, repair, and maintenance. jrlentlon. 
«mfe operations forbidden. 
pectlon of motor vehicles in oper-
rlver vehicle Inspection rcport(s). 
river inspection. 
-Iveaway-towaway operations, in-
ms. 
TY: Pec. 204, 49 Stat. 540, as 
(49 U.S.C. 304), sec. 6, Tub. L. 89-
at. 937 (49 U.S.C. 1655); 49 CFR 
0). 
44 FR 38526, July 2, 1979, unless 
noted. 
*ope. 
era?—Every motor canier, its 
drivers, agents, representa-
d employees directly con-
cerned with the inspection or mainte-
nance of motor vehicles shall comply 
and be conveisant with the rules of 
this part. 
(b) Exemption—il) Intraeity oper-
ations. The rules In this part do not 
apply to a driver or vehicle wholly en-
gaged in exempt Intraeity operations 
as defined In § 390.10 of this subchap-
ter. 
(2) Lightweight mail trucks. The 
rules In this part do not apply to a 
motor carrier or driver engaged In 
transporting mail under contract with 
the U.S. Postal Service in motor vehi-
cles having a manufacturer's gross ve-
hicle weight rating of 4,535 kg (10,000 
pounds) or less. 
§ 396.3 Inspection, rcpnir, and mainte-
nance. 
(a) General—Every motor carrier 
shall systematically Inspect, repair, 
and maintain, or cause to be system-
atically inspected, repaired, and main-
tained, all motor vehicles subject to its 
control. 
(1) Parts and accessories shall be In 
safe and proper operating condition at 
all times. These include those speci-
fied In Part 393 of this subchapter and 
any additional parts and accessories 
which may affect safety of operation, 
including but not limited to, frame 
and frame assemblies, suspension sys-
tems, axles and attaching parts, 
wheels and rims, and steering systems. 
(2) Pushout windows, emergency 
doors, and emergency door marking 
lights in buses shall be Inspected at 
least every 90 days. 
(b) Required records—For vehicles 
controlled for 30 consecutive days or 
more, the motor carriers shall main-
tain, or cause to be maintained, the 
following records for each vehicle: 
(1) An identification of the vehicle 
including company number, If so 
marked, make, serial number, year, 
and tire size. In addition, if the motor 
vehicle is not owned by the motor car-
rier, the record shall Identify the 
name of the person furnishing the ve-
hicle; 
(2) A means to indicate the nature 
and due date of the vaiious inspection 
and maintenance operations to be per-
formed; 
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BOARD OF REVIEW SMII/TK/LRB/mgn 
The Industrial Commission of Utah 
Unemployment Compensation Appeals 
MICHAEL F. GRINNELL J 
S.S.A. No. 304 62 5299 
: Case No. 86-A-563 
vs. : DECISION 
: Case No. 86-BR-106 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY : 
After careful consideration of the record and testimony In the 
above-entitled matter, the Board of Review hereby reverses the decision of 
the Administrative Law Judge which allowed benefits to the claimant effec-
tive December 29, 1905, pursuant to §35-4-5(b)(l) of the Utah Employment 
Security Act, on the grounds the claimant was discharged from his employ-
ment but not for conduct which 1s disqualifying under the provisions of 
§35-4~5(b)(l) of the Utah Employment Security Act; and held the employer, 
May Trucking Company, liable for benefit charges 1n connection with this 
claim. Benefits are denied to the claimant effective December 29, 1905 
and continuing until he has worked 1n bona fide covered employment and 
earned wages equal to at least six times his weekly benefit amount and Is 
otherwise eligible, on the grounds the claimant was discharged from his 
employment for conduct which 1s disqualifying under the provisions of 
§35~4-5(b)(l) of the Act. This disqualification establishes an overpayment 
In the amourrV of $1,351, pursuant to §35~4-6(e) of the Act, which must be 
offset by future benefits to which the claimant may become eligible during 
his current benefit year. The employer, May Trucking Company, Is relieved 
of benefit charges 1n connection with this claim. 
In reversing the decision of the Administrative Law Judge, the 
Board of Review notes that the claimant was discharged from his employ-
ment after returning from a trip when the employer learned: (1) that the 
truck's road speed governor had been altered to.allow driving In excess of 
the 62-mile per hour maximum speed the governor would have allowed,' (2) 
noted that the on-board computer showed the truck had averaged about 66 
miles per hour. (3) that the claimant had operated his vehicle for nearly 
22 hours out ot a 24-hour period, which 1s clearly a violation of both the 
United States Department of Transportation Hours of Service Regulations and 
company policy; and (4) on a urinalysis test for drug usage he was found 
to have used a controlled substance (marijuana). 
The Board of Review acknowledges that there may well be 1n-
sufflent evidence respecting the claimant's use of marijuana to demonstrate 
when the claimant had actually used the drug or what effect, 1f any, the 
use of the drug had upon his driving ability. Nevertheless, the Board of 
Review does not accept the ALJ's conclusion that the claimant's discharge 
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Unemployment Compensation Appeals 
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S.S.A. No. 384 62 5299 
Ca$e No. 86-A-563 
vs. : DECISION 
: Ca*e No. 06-BR-106 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY : 
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should be adjudicated solely on the basis of the evidence respecting the 
claimant's use of marijuana. The employer clearly testified that 1t was 
the cumulative effect of all of the above-listed factors which resulted In 
a decision to terminate the claimant. The employer has noted 1n Its appeal 
that the number of hours which the claimant drove In a 24-hour period 
exceeded double the federal permissible limit and at speeds substantially 
1n excess of the maximum speed limit. Moreover, these violations of com-
pany policy, as well as state and federal laws, were not just isolated 
incidents that had accumulated over the period of the claimant's employ-
ment, but rather were an accumulation of evidence respecting the claimant's 
conduct on the last trip he drove for the employer. The fact that It took 
the employer several days to accumulate and evaluate the evidence cannot 
be used as a..b$s1s for looking only at the strength or weakness of the 
last evidence obtained 1n making the determination of whether the claimant 
should be disqualified under the provisions of §35-4-5(b)(l) of the Act 
and entirely disregarding the more substantial evidence respecting other 
acts that were part of the same Incident. 
This decision will become final ten days after the date of mail-
ing hereof, and any further appeal must be made directly with the Utah 
Supreme Court at the State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, within 
ten days after this decision becomes final. To file an appeal with the 
Supreme Court, you must submit to the Clerk of the Court a Petition for 
Writ of Review setting forth the reasons for appeal, pursuant to §35-4-10(1) 
of the Utah Employment Security Act, followed by a Docketing Statement and 
a Legal Brief. 
/S/ Stephen M. Iladley 
/S/ James F. Hannan 
I dissent. 
I don't feel that the urinalysis test for drug usage results were 
that conclusive, part icular ly where they were taken nearly a week after the 
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claimant's return from the t r ip . Moreover, I do not find that the claim-
ant's driving 66 miles per hour, which admittedly is in violation of the 
law, 1s that appreciably higher than 62 miles an hour, also In violation of 
the law, which the employer basically authorized as evidenced by the fact 
that that's the speed at which the governor was set. 
/S/ Don S. Belka 
\R0 OF REVIEW 
Dated this 29th day of April, 1906. 
Date Mailed: May 1, 1986. 
000 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
Appeals Tribunal 
Decision of Administrative Law Judge 
Michael F. Grinnell 
2575 Hwy 89 
Brlgham City, Utah 84302 
S.S.A. No. 384 62 5299 
Case No. 86-A-563 
APPEAL FILED: January 29, 1986 
APPEARANCES: Claimant/Employer 
DATE OF HEARING: February 19, 1986 
PLACE OF HEARING: Brlgham Olty, Utfch 
The Department's decision dated January 24, 1986 denied unemployment Insurance 
benefits effective December 29, 1986 on the grounds the claimant was discharged 
for just cause. Section 35-4~5(b)( l ) and 35-4-7(c)(3)(F) of the Utah Employment 
Security Act are quoted on the attached sheet. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
Prior to f i l ing a claim for unemployment Insurance benefits effective December 29, 
1985, the claimant worked as a tractor t r a i l e r driver for May Trucking Company from 
September 20, 1984 to December 19, 1985. His weekly benefit amount Is $193.00 for 
26 weeks. 
The claimant was discharged when he was determined to have traces of the drug 
marijuana 1n his system., After returning from a t r i p , a mechanic reported to the 
employer the dashboard on the claimant's truck had been removed and an air control 
valve on the governor had been altered. The governor controlled the truck's 
speed to below 62 miles per hour. An on board computor 'showed the truck had 
averaged about 66 miles per hour. When confronted about the problem, the claimant 
told the safety director, he, had a ir brake problems:: and he had tr ied
 fto correct 
the ;d i f f i cu l t i es . J While• the^nvestlgatlon^lnto the a1rvvalve was belng'conducted; 
the safety director discovered the claimant had recorded an excessive driving 
time on his log. -He had shown nearly 22 hours of driving time 1n a 24 hour 
period. The claimant had violated ICC standards by driving without taking proper 
break time. He was put on suspension as a result of the two Incidents and the 
safety director ordered him to take a physical examination and a urine analysis 
because there was a serious question as to his ab i l i ty to drive the extended time 
period without using amphetamines or other such drugs. The urine analysis estab-
lished he had the trace of marijuana 1n his system. The claimant was discharged 
at that time. 
The employer's policy prohibited the use of drugs or alcohol while employed by the 
company, but there was no written rules available to explain the detai ls of the 
policy. The safety director fe l t the rule applied to a driver regardless of when 
the drugs were used, the claimant understood the rule was violated i f the driver 
304 62 5299 -2- Michael F. Grlnnell 
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consumed the substances while In or around a truck or under the Influence of 
the substances while operating the vehicle. He had consumed the drug about two 
to three weeks before the test was administered and he had not used the substance 
regularly. The urine analysis test had been conducted by a local laboratory, but 
there was no Information available to explain what Influence the amount of drug 
In the claimant's system might have had on the claimant. 
The claimant had a good performance record with the employer and he had not had 
any prior disciplinary problems. Due to his record, the employer had chosen to 
give him a suspension following the Incidents Involving the governor and the 
ICC violation of excessive driving time rather than discharge him. 
REASONING AND CONCLUSION OF LAW: 
A denial of unemployment Insurance benefits following a discharge 1s based on a 
fault concept, as explained 1n the following decision: 
When an employee 1s discharged by his employer, such dis-
charge msy have been the result of Incompetence, lack of 
skill, or other reasons which are clearly beyond the 
claimant's control. The fact of willful or wanton conduct 
Is not established merely by the claimant's knowledge that 
he Is violating a reasonable rule of the employer; rather, 
1t must be shown from the evidence that the claimant knew 
or had reason to know that his conduct may result 1n loss 
of employment. (Utah Board of Review, 80-BR-322.) 
In the present case, the evidence clearly established the claimant's discharge 
was the result of the discovery of a drug 1n his system and the other incidents 
were not the primary reason for the termination. The employer was justified In 
having a policy designed to control and eliminate the problems of drug or alcohol 
used among Its truck drivers, but 1n this Instance there 1s substantial confusion 
as to the understanding of that rule and the application of the rule \n the 
claimant's case. The claimant testified credibly that he-had not consumed the 
drug for a considerable amount of time and he was not a regular user of the drug. 
He understood he was not 1n violation of the rule unless the drug had an influence, 
on his driving performance or he had consumed the drug 1n or around a company 
vehicle. There was Insufficient evidence provided* to support the employer's 
contention the claimant knew he would be terminated for any use of drugs and the 
employer did not meet Its burden of proof In this case to show the claimant had 
knowledge he would lose his job under the circumstances. It 1s therefore concluded 
the claimant was not discharged for just cause 1n accordance with the Utah Employ-
ment Security Act. 
It Is noted this decision does not attempt to determine the reasonableness of the 
employer's rule. 
The Utah Employment Security Act relieves an employer of charges for unemployment 
Insurance benefits when the claimant was discharged for reasons which are disquali-
fying under Section 35~4-5(b) of the Act. The Act does not grant relief when the 
reason for the discharge would not have resulted \r\ a disqualification, even 1f the 
discharge resulted from circumstances over which the employer had no control. In 
00 
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s case, the claimant was not discharged for disqualifying reasons and the 
loyer 1sf therefore, Inel igible for re l ie f of charges. 
I S I O N : 
decision of the Department Representative Is reversed and benefits are allowed 
ectlve December 29, 1905 pursuant to Section 35-4-5(b)(l) of the Utah Employ-
it Security Act provided the claimant was otherwise eligible. 
employer, May Trucking Company, 1s not relieved of charges as provided by 
tlon 35-4-7(c)(3)(F) of the Utah Employment Security Act and 1s .liable for its 
)-rated share of benefit costs paid to this claimant. 
~ l e rryv71C(mp^/j dffa\ Administrative Vm /TJcJge 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
1s decision wi l l become final unless within ten days from February 26. 1906, 
irther written appeal 1s made to the Board of Review (P. 0. Box 1 VCDO, Salt LakV 
ty , Utah 83T37) setting forth the grounds upon which the appeal Is made. 
tachrnent 
May Truck 1ng\Company 
O O l l 
MAY TRUCKING O 
POST OFFICE BOX 218 • U\YTON, UTAH 
jpV £^3S>-?? 
January 16, 1986 
To Whom it May Concern: 
Mr. Grinnell was discharged for violation of company rules and 
regulations by tampering with the equipment he operated ahd by violating 
U.S. Department of Transporation Rules and Regulation by accumulating 
a number of log and hours of service violations. Particular sections 
he violated are DOT safety regulations 395.3 and 395.13 concerning the 
amount of driving time allowed and its logging. Mr. Grinnell was sus-
pended for only one week due to his previously exemplary employment 
here. One condition to return to work is a physical exam and urinalysis. 
Mr. Grinnellfs urinalysis returned positive for marijuana and sub-
sequent testing confirmed the first analysis. Marijuana usage is in 
violation of, U.S. DOT rule 392.4 at which point, Mr. Grinnell was 
terminated. 
Sincerely, 
fjtj 
Greg Weigel 
Personnel Manager 
!. L vi t 7 
006 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served four (4) true and correct 
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT by placing the same 
in United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to LINDA 
WHEAT FIELD, Attorney for the Board of Review of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 1234 South Main Street, P.O. Box 11600, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 this cJjt$[ day of August, 19 86. 
TED K. GODFREY 
Attorney for Appellant 
